Sweatshop Labor: A Moral Critique of Economic Reasoning
Prologue
Sweatshop labor: the two magic words universally dreaded by any firm hoping to avoid a public relations maelstrom. Who could blame them? Take for example Nike, the popular shoemaker that once faced the public’s damning furor for its association with offshore manufacturing contractors engaged in sweatshop labor. Critics of sweatshop labor seem to take at face value that sweatshops are simply immoral and exploitative, and therefore firms have a moral responsibility to not employ sweatshop workers. And yet, those critics have also failed to prove exactly how removing opportunities and reducing employment options available to the most economically vulnerable is morally righteous over sweatshops themselves. The point is not necessarily that sweatshops are ideal, but as Benjamin Powell and Matt Zwolinski (2012) argue, are sweatshops truly immoral if they are economic opportunities for those that need them the most? The following analysis will evaluate conceptions of rational choice, opportunity, and welfare to argue that unless opponents of sweatshop labor are able to somehow produce a blueprint for how higher wages and improved working conditions can be feasibly instituted without reducing employment, their aversion against sweatshop labor has no moral ground. Furthermore, we will also consider whether the repugnance that opponents of sweatshop labor espouse are in fact a reflection of their willingness to impose their normative normal frameworks on the economically vulnerable, even at the cost of their welfare and autonomy.
A Worker’s Worth
The core of the anti-sweatshop argument is as follows: underpaid workers employed under dangerous working conditions are immorally exploited, and therefore their employment and the products that they may produce should be avoided at all costs. After all, how could anyone morally and conscionably condone putting laborers in the way of danger and paying them what amounts to peanuts? Well, we must first consider whether sweatshop workers are simply paid low wages or underpaid–that distinction is infinitely important. In fact, it seems lost on sweatshop critics that the term “underpaid worker” is even an oxymoron under some economic assumptions. Consider the following example:
Abdullah lives in Pakistown, a community impoverished by natural disasters. Abdullah, of free choice and sound will, seeks employment to feed his family and because his labor is worth at most $2 an hour, he is offered $2 an hour by the local sweatshop. Karen resides in an affluent neighborhood in San Francisco, and upon hearing of Abdullah’s labor terms, she exclaims, “What deplorable and greedy those sweatshops are for paying him a wage that amounts to peanuts!” She writes to her local congresswoman who eventually sponsors legislation banning the import of sweatshop-produced goods into America. Karen is ecstatic for her part in making a difference in this world. Abdullah, his family, and many residents of Pakistown lose their employment and perish from hunger.
If Abdullah, of free choice and sound will, accepts employment that pays $2 an hour, then deep down he likely believes his labor is worth at most $2 an hour. Had the sweatshop offered to underpay him a wage of $1 an hour, he would have not accepted the offer. Of course, the sweatshop could threaten, coerce, or enslave Abdullah into providing his labor at a wage below what he would agree to, but our analysis spans neither slavery nor coercion. If Abdullah produces $2 worth of value per hour of his labor–economists would call this his Marginal Product of Labor (MPL)–for his sweatshop employer who pays him $2 per hour for his labor, then opponents of sweatshops can argue that Abdullah is paid a low wage by drawing on whatever metric or comparison they would like to use, but they cannot argue that Abdullah is underpaid. Incidentally, even if the sweatshop offered Abdullah $4 per hour–double the value he produces in an hour–sweatshop critics can point to the U.S. federal minimum wage of $7.25 an hour and still accuse sweatshops of underpay despite overpay.
In the colorful example painted above, Karen and her fellow sweatshop critics, despite their probably well-meaning intentions, sought to shut down the sweatshop plants in Pakistown thinking residents like Abdullah would no longer be subject to what they believed were unreasonable wages. Deep in their heart, they probably believed they did justice to people like Abdullah across the world. But the philosophical question is this: if they ended up forcing Abdullah out of his job and pushing him and his family into abject poverty and eventual death from hunger, were their intentions truly moral and just in the first place or a veiled disguise for their need to assuage their own personal discomfort and unease with the life people like Abdullah are born into? Put another way, Karen could have relieved her own moral dissonance over Abdullah’s circumstances by donating money and food to Abdullah at her own cost, but she instead chose to sooth her discomfort at the cost of Abdullah and his family. Rather than lift Abdullah and his family out of their already dire economic circumstances, Karen did what she thought was best by reducing the already scarce economic opportunities available to people like Abdullah instead of giving them more opportunities. As Powell and Zwolinski (2012) aptly articulate, “the fundamental reason to oppose [anti-sweatshop activity] is that it hurts those that can least afford to be hurt.”
Just Treat Em’ Better
Now, critics of sweatshops may say, “What about the deplorable and unsafe working conditions sweatshop workers are subjected to? You can’t defend that!” The answer to that question is perhaps more subtle than the sweatshop critic would think. Let us imagine the following scenario:
Abdullah works for a sweater sweatshop in Pakistown that is transparent about their demanding output quotas, absence of benefits, low pay, hostile management, and unsafe conditions. Karen of San Francisco is so disgusted by Abdullah’s working conditions that she mobilizes her fellow sweatshop critics to propose legislation banning all sweaters produced under unsafe conditions. The sweatshop is forced to adopt safety measures, loosen quotas, and provide insurance benefits. As a result, the cost of hiring each worker is two times higher, so the sweatshop fires half its workers including Abdullah. Karen now feels much better about wearing her sweater produced under favorable working conditions. Abdullah, his former co-workers, and their families starve to death.
Unfortunately for both Abdullah and anti-sweatshop activists, most things in this world are not free, and that includes treating your workers better. If the cost of hiring workers like Abdullah doubles from $2 to $4 due to additional costs associated with relaxed quotas, worker benefits, safer conditions, then workers must either double their productivity or face their inevitable layoff. Again, Karen may have believed she helped force sweatshops to pull better working conditions out of thin air for workers like Abdullah, but in reality all she did was make unproductive workers like Abdullah too costly to hire. To add insult to injury, Karen thought she knew what was better for Abdullah than Abdullah himself; Abdullah knew exactly what he was getting into when he accepted sweatshop employment–he internalized the working conditions, tight quotas, and lack of benefits before coming to the conclusion he was better off with a job than without but. Now, Abdullah does not even have the option to work and is forced to starve simply because Karen of San Francisco believed the laws and consequences of economics were irrelevant to the urge to soothe her own moral unease. Once again, instead of presenting workers like Abdullah with more economic opportunities, the anti-sweatshop activists have undermined their autonomy to make choices that align with their needs and values.
And so, another philosophical question emerges: in forcefully pushing for changes to the terms of sweatshop workers’ employment regardless of the economic consequences, can sweatshop critics truly say their advocacy is morally superior to sweatshops themselves? Karen may believe she improved the welfare of sweatshop workers by improving their working conditions, but as Powell and Zwolinski note, if workers like Abdullah would much rather forgo better working conditions for higher pay or even to just keep their jobs, then it is arguably immoral and unjust for Karen to make that choice for the workers. Perhaps the sweatshop critics’ advocacy is a reflection of their willingness to impose their own set of normative frameworks on the workers even at the cost of their economic welfare and autonomy. While this advocacy may relieve the anti-sweatshop critics’ moral discomfort or help Karen feel better about wearing her sweater, they should not make the hubristic mistake of assuming they can enjoy that comfort on moral high ground.
A Counterargument
The anti-sweatshop activist, having lost the argument on economic grounds, is now more than happy to draw on Kantian ethics to argue that the motive, attitudes, and perceptions that firms have towards sweatshop workers are at least as important as the economic consequences of employing sweatshop workers. To illustrate, imagine the following scenario:
Eric is the owner and manager of the sweatshop that employs Abdullah. Eric pays Abdullah $2 an hour, the same amount that Abdullah generates in value for Eric through each hour of his labor. Both Eric and Abdullah agree $2 is a fair wage. However, Eric believes workers like Abdullah are nothing but mere tools, a means to an end to enrich himself. In fact, if Eric could, he would pay Abdullah less than he currently does, even if it means Abdullah and his family have to endure hardship and hunger. And even if he could magically improve the working conditions for Abdullah and his coworkers at no cost, he would choose not to because he simply couldn't care less about their welfare. Eric, however, still pays Abdullah $2 per hour because Abdullah would not accept any less. Abdullah is grateful for the economic opportunity to feed his family.
In the above example, Eric’s sweatshop may have created opportunities for the economically disadvantaged like Abdullah. Moreover, Abdullah’s economic welfare is actually with the sweatshop than without. And yet, as sweatshop critics argue, Eric’s utter lack of respect and disregard for Abdullah’s dignity and humanity should be at least just as relevant as economic welfare when evaluating the morality of Eric’s relationship with Abdullah. Moreover, as Joshua Preiss notes, Kant would argue that Abdullah’s dependence on the abhorrent terms and conditions that sweatshops offer to feed himself and his family renders him unfree regardless of whether or not Abdullah agreed to his employment of free choice and sound will (2015).
A Rebuttal
While anti-sweatshop activists may be correct in arguing that Eric’s lack of respect for Abdullah’s dignity and humanity is blatantly immoral and unjust, it is also important to consider whether that Eric’s attitudes are a reflection of Eric himself and not necessarily sweatshops. Plenty of executives would pay their white collar workers less while stripping away their benefits and worsening their working conditions if they could get away with it at no cost to productivity and morale, and even then those white collar workers would still be far from sweatshop workers. The Kantian reasoning that sweatshop opponents cite may be right in that respect for dignity and humanity are imperative to just world, but it is not necessarily particular only to sweatshops. Had Eric loved and respected Abdullah despite not being able to feasibly pay him more than $2 an hour, Karen and her fellow activists probably would have still cried foul regardless.
As for the sweatshop critic’s moral discomfort with workers’ dependence on sweatshops rendering them unfree, perhaps their moral discomfort is misplaced and misdirected. A strong argument can be made that Karen feels uncomfortable about living in a world where workers resort to sweatshops to survive, not sweatshops themselves. She thinks to herself, “Wouldn’t it be great if no one in this world had to endure such harshness and pain? Even better yet, wouldn't it be great if no one had to work at all!” And while it would be great if we lived in a world where no one is forced to work in sweatshops, we should not make the mistake of equating our idealistic fantasies to the immorality of sweatshops.
A Conclusion
What this analysis has hopefully shown is that opponents of sweatshop labor, while perhaps well meaning, are misguided and should be wary of dismissing the economic argument for sweatshops without presenting a feasible alternative that respects the welfare of the vulnerable population they purport to protect. Reducing the economic opportunities available to those who need them most for the sake of easing one’s own moral discomfort and dissonance with the reality we live in is hardly moral or just, but arguably arrogant and self-righteous. Until opponents of sweatshops present a way forward that is both grounded in reality and does not impose moral frameworks on those that cannot afford to adopt them, the economic case for sweatshops is still very much the moral case for sweatshops.
Bibliography
Powell, B., & Zwolinski, M. (2011). The ethical and economic case against sweatshop labor: A critical assessment. Journal of Business Ethics, 107(4), 449–472. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-011-1058-8
Preiss, J. (2014). Global labor justice and the limits of economic analysis. Business Ethics Quarterly, 24(1), 55–83. https://doi.org/10.5840/beq20141272